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I.

INTRODUCTION

"The likelihood of being sued for malpractice is now so great that the
practicing physician must recognize that it constitutes a definite occupational
hazard."'
There are many patients injured or who die as a result of medical
negligence. 2 The American Medical Association 3 (AMA) has reported results of
a physician survey, revealing that more than 40% of the physicians surveyed4
"had a medical liability claim filed against them at some point in their career.",5
Certainly, some of these medical negligence claims are without merit.
However, the meritorious claims implicate physician carelessness-the failure to
comply with the applicable standard of care.

Even if medical negligence claims are predictable, they are not the only
professional problems facing physicians. Physicians admit patients to hospitals

1. Louis J. Regan, Malpractice,An OccupationalHazard, 156 JAMA 1317 (1954). Of
course, it is most interesting that this "hazard" was recognized or predicted almost sixty years ago.
2. See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits: An Essay on Patient Interests, the
Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Policy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 (2005)
(citing PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 44, 44 tbl. 3.2., 12-4-29 (1993)) (discussing the results
of a Harvard study of medical negligence).
3.
Our Mission, AMA, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-mission.page (last
visited Nov. 13, 2011). The AMA is an influential voluntary medical association. Its mission is
"[t]o promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public health." Id. For
historical and organizational background, see Note, The American Medical Association: Power,
Purpose, and Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938 (1954).
4.
Carol K. Kane, Policy Research Perspectives: Medical Liability Claim Frequency. A
2007-2008 Snapshot of Physicians, AMA, 2 (Aug. 2010), http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/
upload/mm/363/prp-201001-claim-freq.pdf.
5.
See THOMAS H. COHEN & KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN SEVEN STATES, 20002004 NCJ 216339, at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf
(suggesting that a large percentage of medical negligence claims are closed without payment to
claimants).
6.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 631-32 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (noting that
the standard of care contemplates "physicians acting within the ambit of their professional work
[exercising] the skill, knowledge, and care normally possessed and exercised by other members of
their profession of the same school of practice in the relevant medical community" (citing Keebler
v. Winfield Carraway Hosp., 531 So. 2d 841, 845 (Ala. 1988) (defining reasonable skill); Self v.
Exec. Comm. of Ga.Baptist Convention of Ga. Inc., 266 S.E.2d 168, 168-69 (Ga. 1980) (defining
what constitutes professional negligence); Purtill v. Hess, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872 (I11.
1986) (same);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmt. e (1965) (same))).
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and practice medicine on hospital premises through grants of staff privileges.7
Physician misconduct orsperformance problems can lead to privilege suspension,
limitation, or revocation.
Physicians also may suffer disciplinary problems. Disciplinary action is
taken by "regulatory bodies that investigate and adjudicate alleged violations of
law, ethics, or practice standards." 9 More than one study has identified multiple
transgressions leading to discipline, including negligence/incompetence,
inappropriate prescribing, alcohol/drug use, sexual misconduct, unlicensed
activity, fraud, mental/physical illness, and misrepresentation of credentials. 10
Assuming the truth of the lawsuit as an "occupational hazard" phenomenon,
medical negligence litigation is common enough that a discussion of certain
evidentiary issues is worthwhile. 1 These issues relate to proof of physician
character and reputation,' 2 propensity to practice medicine in a specific
exemplary or substandard fashion, 13 prior lawsuits,' 4 treatment of other
patients,' and prior restrictions on privileges and licensing. 16 Is there a place for

7.
See generally Jimenez v. Wellstar Health Sys., 596 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2010)
("Medical staff privileges allow a physician both to treat patients at the privilege-granting hospital
and to receive patient referrals from that hospital."); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 9798 (2d ed. 2000) (footnote omitted) ("A physician or other health care professional may admit or
treat patients in a particular hospital only if the practitioner has admitting or clinical privileges at
that hospital."); Andrew K. Dolan & Richard S. Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the
Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REv. 707, 709-12 (1981) (explaining the nuances of hospital privileges).
8. See Jimenez, 596 F.3d at 1307 (recounting the suspension of medical staff privileges
following complaints that the physician "failed to promptly respond to emergency-room calls, failed
to timely make rounds to see patients, and performed inappropriate operations"); Dolan & Ralston,
supra note 7, at 712 (discussing revocation of privileges).
9.
James Morrison & Peter Wickersham, Physicians Disciplinedby a State Medical Board,
279 JAMA 1889, 1889 (1998).
10. See id. at 1891 tbl.2; Neal D. Kohatsu et al., CharacteristicsAssociated with Physician
Discipline:A Case-Control Study, 164 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 653, 655 tbl.2 (2004).
11. See Regan, supra note 1, at 1317.
12. See, e.g., Blevins v. Clark, 740 N.E.2d 1235, 1238-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that
although the trial court allowed testimony of the obstetrician's professional reputation, the error was
harmless); Holiday v. Cutchin, 316 S.E.2d 55, 58-59 (N.C. 1984) (noting that character evidence
offered by the physician himself was inadmissible, without determining whether the error was
harmless).
13. See, e.g., Mousseau v. Schwartz, 756 N.W.2d 345, 354 (S.D. 2008) (concluding that the
injured plaintiff should have been able to introduce the relevant stipulation to the jury that the
neurosurgeon "failed to even possess the degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by
neurosurgeons").
14. It has been reported that a physician's early claim history is predictive of subsequent
claims. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & Kenneth R. Petronis, The Relationship Between Physicians'
Malpractice Claims History and Later Claims: Does the Past Predictthe Future?, 272 JAMA 1421,
1425 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Birudavol v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 864 N.E.2d 494, 495, 497 (Mass.
2007) (affirming the trial court's ruling that the state medical board properly sanctioned a physician
for substandard treatment of four patients which "called into question his competence to practice
medicine").
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proof of these matters in a medical negligence suit when the focus of the
litigation is whether the defendant physician complied with the applicable
standard of care in treating a particular patient at a particular time?
II. RULES OF EVIDENCE INVOLVED

This inquiry implicates questions of relevance and the scope of crossexamination. Only relevant evidence is admissible, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 402.17 Relevance is defined by Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as follows:
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action. 18
For evidence to constitute relevant evidence, it need not clear a very high
hurdle-"[r]elevant evidence is evidence that in some degree advances the
inquiry."' 19 However, even though the relevance hurdle is low, not all relevant
evidence is actually admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 403, which operates
to exclude certain evidence with a probative value outweighed by concerns of
prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, or other reasons.2 °
In focusing on a defendant physician's prior practice history, disciplinary
problems,
and prior lawsuits, Rule 40421 takes center stage. In
and privileges
404 provides:
relevant
part, Rule

16. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 674, 679 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (holding
that after finding that the physician's licenses to practice medicine in two states had been suspended
due to unrelated felony convictions, "the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting counsel from
examining [the physician] about his statements about his suspensions in his interrogatory answer
and deposition").
17. FED. R. EvID. 402.
18. FED. R. EVID. 401.
19. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 309 (6th ed. 2006)
(emphasis added).
20. FED. R. EVID. 403.
21. FED. R. EvID. 404.
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Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person's character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.
(3) Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's
character may be admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case.
This
evidence may be admissible for another purposes, such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident....
Rule 404(a) and (b) operate to focus the evidence, and the jury, on the claim
for which the defendant is on trial and to exclude evidence of prior good or bad
deeds, the admission of which might influence the jury to decide the defendant's
fate based on reputation or history. The goal is not to distract the jury but to
have the jury concentrate on the case at bar.
To the extent that a physician's prior professional problems may have
occurred on a regular, repetitive basis, Rule 40623 may be involved. It provides
as follows:
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice
Evidence of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice
may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or
organization acted in accordance with the habit or routine practice.
The court may admit this evidence regardless of whether it is
corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness. 24
Evidence of habit is relevant pursuant to Rule 406 and may be admissible,25
whereas character and propensity evidence is typically inadmissible pursuant to
Rule 404.26 The distinction between character and habit has been explained as

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1), (a)(3), (b)(1)-(2).
FED. R. EVID. 406.
Id.
See FED. R. EvID. 402, 406.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
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follows: "Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or of
the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or
is more specific. It denotes one's
peacefulness. Habit, in the present context,
27
regular response to a repeated situation."
Therefore, admissible habit evidence could "save" otherwise inadmissible
serious evidentiary problems for physicians in
character evidence and create
28
cases.
negligence
medical
At the trial of a medical negligence case, physician witnesses, including
expert witnesses, are subject to cross-examination. 29 The credibility of a witness
is a focus of cross-examination. 30 Rules 607 and 608 are implicated here and
provide, in relevant part, as follows:
Rule 607. Who May Impeach a Witness
Any party, including the3 party that called the witness, may attack
the witness's credibility. '
Rule 608. A Witness's Character for Truthfulness or
Untruthfulness
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence. A witness's credibility may
be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness's
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,
or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But
evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness's
character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal
conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
prove specific instances of a witness's conduct in order to attack or
support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the court may,
on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are
probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
the witness being cross(2) another witness whose character
32
examined has testified about.

27. BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 195, at 322.
28. See, e.g., Gasiorowski v. Hose, 897 P.2d 678, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (referring to the
physician's "habit or routine practice of threading epidural catheters to excessive depth").
29. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). As the Court in
Daubert indicated, "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence." Id.
30. FED. R. EvID. 611(b); BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 33, at 60-61.
31. FED. R. EvID. 607.
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Rule 608 "governs the use of character and conduct evidence for the purpose
33
Rule 608 does
of impeaching the general character of a witness for honesty."
not concern "other matters that34might tend to make the witness's testimony less
credible in the particular case."
Witnesses are always subject to cross-examination as to "matters relevant to
the witness's credibility. "35 Cross-examination offers the "opportunity to elicit
answers impeaching the witness's veracity, capacity to observe, impartiality and
consistency. ' 36 The cross-examination of a physician witness may become quite
uncomfortable if a physician's prior history of litigation and discipline is fair
game for inquiry.
This paper will explore the willingness of state and federal trial courts to
admit evidence of a physician's character, reputation, and prior acts in medical
negligence litigation. This analysis will yield some ground rules for courts to
follow when considering the admissibility of highly influential and prejudicial
evidence. Additionally, to the extent that potentially damaging evidence of this
sort may be well received by trial courts, the medical profession might consider
the instruction of medical students, physicians in training, and practitioners on
this topic. The law of medical evidence relates quite well to the concept of
medical negligence litigation as an occupational hazard.
HI. PHYSICIAN REPUTATION

There is a core of older, classic cases supporting the position that a
physician's reputation for skill or lack thereof is not relevant to the determination
time. 37
of a physician's negligence in treating a particular patient at a particular
of an
These cases conform to the principle that "[m]ost courts ...
38 reject proof
actor's character for care by means of reputation evidence."
In Holtzman v. Hoy, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered a medical
negligence action against a surgeon who provided treatment for a leg fracture.39
A defense witness, also a physician, was asked this question, which the trial
court did not permit the witness to answer: "I will ask you what his [Dr.
Holtzman's] reputation is in the community, and among the profession, as being
an ordinarily skillful and learned physician?" 4°

32. FED. R. EvID. 608.
33. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY § 608.1, at 312 (6th ed. 2009).
34. Id.
35. BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 21, at 47.
36. Id. § 22, at 49.
1886); Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, 27 P. 404 (Mont.
37. E.g., Holtzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832 (Ill.
1891); Green v. Shaw, 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226 (1926); Hackler v. Ingram, 196 S.W. 279 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1917).
38. BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 189, at 314.
39. See Holtzman, 8 N.E. at 832.
40. Id. (alteration in original).
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The Supreme Court of Illinois, with flourish, explained its approval of the
exclusion of evidence of the defendant's reputation as follows:
It does not, however, follow that because the defendant's skill, or rather
the want of it, was put in issue, that it could be either established or
disproved by showing his general reputation. While his skill, or the
want of it, was put in issue, his reputation in that respect was not put in
issue, and therefore evidence to establish it was properly excluded.
Suppose it appeared from the evidence that the treatment of the
plaintiffs leg was proper, and in every respect according to the most
approved surgery, and evidence of the character offered had been
admitted, would it have availed the plaintiff anything if it further
appeared from the evidence that the defendant was generally reputed to
be an unskillful and unsafe surgeon? Surely not. The hypothesis here
suggested, as we conceive, is but a presentation, from a different standpoint, of the principle contended for, but in a way that more forcibly
illustrates its unsoundness.
There are many reasons outside of those mentioned why evidence
of this character is not admissible. First, its bearing upon the issue is
too remote, and in many, if not in most, cases it would tend to mislead
the jury, rather than enlighten them. The veriest quack in the country,
by his peculiar methods, not unfrequently becomes very famous for the
time being in his own locality, so much so that every person in the
neighborhood might safely testify to his good reputation. It is true that
one's reputation, thus acquired, is generally of short duration. His
patrons sooner or later must pay the penalty of their credulity by
becoming the victims of her ignorance, and with that his good name
vanishes. Yet, according to the principle contended for, the quack, in
such case, when called to account for his professional ignorance, might
successfully entrench himself behind his previous good reputation.
Again, one may in many respects be a good practitioner, and deservedly
stand well in the neighborhood in which he lives, and yet, at the same
time, be grossly ignorant about some matters, in the line of his
profession which would render him liable if, by reason thereof, his
patient should be improperly treated, and thereby subjected to loss or
injury. In such case, it is manifest evidence of the defendant's good
reputation would be no answer to an action brought for the injury
sustained, and its admission would be clearly calculated to mislead the
jury. Other illustrations might be given of the 4impropriety of admitting
such testimony, but it is not necessary to do so. 1

41. Id. at 832-33.
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Almost five years following Holtzman, the Supreme Court of Montana
spoke on this topic in Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe.42 Stevenson involved a medical43
negligence action against a physician who treated the plaintiffs broken wrist.
The jury returned a verdict against the defendant physician and the trial court
denied the defendant's request for a new trial.44
Unlike in Holtzman, where the trial court excluded evidence of the
defendant physician's reputation, 45 the trial court in Stevenson permitted
"witnesses to testify as to defendant's reputation ...for skill and ability as a
physician." 46 Finding that testimony improper, the Montana Supreme Court
stated:
Defendant's reputation as a physician was not in issue. It was his
specific acts in the treatment of a certain case, and the facts as to
whether his acts were unskillful and negligent in this treatment was the
matter in issue. A doctor's reputation for skill and ability will not
exonerate him, where gross negligence and want of the application of
skill is alleged and proved. Nor can the fact that a doctor is reputed to
be negligent or unskillful be allowed as proof to establish negligence or
unskillful treatment in a particular case, because he may have treated
that case with unusual skill and care. The introduction of that evidence
was not only improper from a legal view, but it was of a character which
may have unjustly prejudiced defendant's case before the jury upon a
point where defendant had made no preparation to defend.47

In 1917, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, in Hackler v. Ingram," held
that a physician's reputation or character for care is inadmissible in a medical
negligence case.49

Hackler concerned a claim against a surgeon who had

operated on the patient and was allegedly negligent in closing the operative
wound. 5 ) The jury returned a verdict against the defendant physician.5 I
On appeal, the defendant urged that the trial court erred in refusing "to
permit evidence of numerous physicians who offered to testify that they had
observed [the defendant] in operations, and that he was a skillful, competent, and
careful surgeon.' ' 52 The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the trial court's
ruling, noting that "[h]owever careful and competent a person may be generally,

42. 27 P. 404 (Mont. 1891).
43. Id. at 404.
44. id.
45. Holtzman, 8 N.E. at 832.
46. Stevenson, 27 P. at 406.
47. Id. at 406-07.
48. 196 S.W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
49. Id. at 281.
50. Id. at 280.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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such fact is no defense to a specific act of negligence." 53 The court elaborated its
position by referring to Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence, 54 which cited
Massachusetts case law with approval, stating that "[w]hen the precise act or
omission of a defendant is proved, the question whether it is actionable
negligence is to be decided by the character of that act or omission, and not by
the character for care and caution that the defendant may sustain." 55 The jury
verdict against the defendant physician was affirmed. 56
In 1926, the Supreme Court of South Carolina decided Green v. Shaw,
which involved a medical negligence claim against a physician who had treated
the plaintiff for a finger malady. 58 The jury returned a verdict for the
defendant. 59 Plaintiff appealed, claiming "[e]rror in admitting the testimony of
Dr. Jennings and of Dr. Mcintosh 'as to the efficiency and carefulness of [the
defendant] and as to his reputation.' "6
The testimony of these physicians developed as follows:
When Dr. R. T. Jennings, a witness for the defendant, was on the
stand, he testified as follows; this testimony being admitted by the court
over the objection of the plaintiff.
"Q. What is your observation of Dr. Shaw as to his efficiency or
carefulness in general?
Mr. Herbert: We object. We haven't attacked Dr. Shaw's reputation
as a physician. That hasn't been put in issue. He may be a very good
physician, and he may have done a very careless thing; he may be very
careful, and he may have done a very careless thing.
The Court: It seems to me it has some probative value. I think it is
competent.
Mr. Herbert: Dr. Shaw's reputation as a careful physician?
The Court: Yes, sir.
Mr. Herbert: I ask to note my objection.
A. He has always been very careful with me and I have got good
results.
The Court: I don't think he is entitled to go into specific cases, but
only his general reputation."
When Dr. James H. McIntosh, who was also a witness for the
defendant, was on the stand, he testified along the same line:

53. Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
54. Id. (citing Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 48 S.W. 568, 569 (Tex. 1898)).
55. Id. (quoting Tenney v. Tuttle, 83 Mass. 185, 186-87(1861)).
56. Id.
57. 136 S.C. 56, 134 S.E. 226 (1926).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 59, 134 S.E. at 226.
60. Id.
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"Q. From your general knowledge, please state what is Dr. Shaw's
reputation professionally as a careful and expert operator.
Mr. Herbert: We object for the same reasons.
The Court: The same ruling.
Witness: I have used him in a great many cases where X-ray work
was necessary.
The Court: One minute-what is his reputation?
Witness: His reputation is good as an X-ray man."'
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the admission of this
testimony was reversible error, stating that:
A physician might be ever so skillful or competent in a general way, or
might have an unexcelled reputation, and yet be guilty of the grossest
negligence in his treatment of a particular case. It is clear to reason,
therefore, that, in the case at bar, testimony as to Dr. Shaw's reputation
62
was inadmissible ....
The court cited with approval Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, Hackler v. Ingram, and
Holtzman v. Hoy.63 Referring to physician specialists and general practitioners,
the court noted that they "are alike subject to the rule that they cannot escape the
consequences of their negligent acts in a special case by showing or attempting
to show their general reputation for skill and competency."'
These venerable cases teach that evidence of physician reputation, good or
bad, is inadmissible in medical negligence litigation. They pre-date the Federal
Rules of Evidence by many years. These cases, nevertheless, would withstand
the test of time and the current Rules 401/403 analysis. Even if evidence of
reputation arguably survives Rule 401 scrutiny-the "any tendency" 66 relevancy
test-which is unlikely, it does not survive Rule 403 scrutiny. Reputation
evidence would tend to mislead the jury and focus it on matters collateral to the
trial. Therefore, reputation evidence should be excluded.67

61. Id. at 59-60, 134 S.E. at 226-27.
62. Id. at 60, 134 S.E. at 227.
63. Id. at 60-62, 134 S.E. at 227-28 (citing Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, 27 P. 404 (Mont. 1891);
Hacker v. Ingram, 196 S.W. 279 (Texas Civ. App. 1917); Holtzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832 (111. 1886)).
64. Id. at 63, 134 S.E. at 228.
65. See Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No.
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
66. FED. R. EvID. 401.
67. For two more recent examples of the well-founded rule excluding reputation evidence in
medical negligence cases, see Holiday v. Cutchin, 316 S.E.2d 55, 58 (N.C. 1984), in which the
defendant physician attempted to utilize the following reputational evidence:
Q. Dr. Wilkerson, are you personally acquainted with Dr. Lawrence Cutchin?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know his general character and reputation?
MR. McLEOD: Objection.
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IV. PRIOR LAWSUITS AGAINST THE PHYSICIAN DEFENDANT

The simple fact that a defendant physician has been named as a defendant in
prior medical negligence cases should not constitute admissible evidence.
Previously filed lawsuits are not admissible to prove that the defendant
is
69
negligent inthe case at bar.68 Therefore, a pre-trial motion in limine

should

address this potential evidence and should include references to all prior lawsuits
for medical negligence filed against the defendant physician.70
Comments by counsel in an opening statement regarding prior medical
negligence lawsuits filed against a physician defendant are improper.7' Consider
the interesting strategy of plaintiff's counsel reported by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Lai v. Sagle. 2 Here, in opening statement, plaintiffs counsel
remarked, "Dr. Lai moved to Hagerstown in August of 1994 at the invitation of
his friend, Dr. Su. He never looked for ...other practice environments. By the

THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. Do you know his general character and reputation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is it?
MR. McLEOD: Objection.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A. I have known Dr. Cutchin since he was a resident in Chapel Hill and since his
starting practice in Tarboro. And he's not only a fine physician but also a public spirited
individual who has done many things to help the health care of people in eastern North
Carolina, particularly in his county.
MR. McLEOD: Objection. Not responsive
THE COURT: Denied.
Q. Go ahead.
A. I have also known him socially, and he's come to some social events here in
Greenville and I have met him at State Medical Society meetings and other medical
meetings, and have found him to be interested in the subject matter at hand but the
welfare and health of people of eastern North Carolina but he had a fine spirit in trying to
provide for that welfare.
MR. McLEOD: Move to strike.
THE COURT: Denied.
See also Hudson v. Lenz, No. H025047, 2004 WL 823492, at *21 (Cal. App. Dist. Apr.
16, 2004) (defendant physician "introduced testimony from two witnesses, Nurse Kohler
and Nurse Parrish, to the effect that Dr. Lenz: (1) was a 'careful practitioner'; and (2) was
never observed to jeopardize the safety of his patients (either mother or baby)").
68. See, e.g., Lai v. Sagle, 818 A.2d 237, 247 (Md. 2003).
69. See ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 43 (3d ed. 2011) ("A motion in limine is a common
method for raising evidentiary matters of a substantial or highly prejudicial nature, the resolution of
which will influence the conduct of the trial. This anticipatory motion, usually made in writing
before the beginning of the trial, gives the lawyers an opportunity to ensure that objectionable and
particularly prejudicial information will never be offered in front [sic] the jurors, who will never
hear it.").
70. See Lai, 818 A.2d at 244 (discussing the need for a motion in limine to prevent
prejudicial evidence from being introduced at trial).
71. E.g.,id.at248.
72. Id. at 240.
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way, when Dr. Lai was practicing in Michigan for eight years, he was sued five
7
times for malpractice."7
Defense counsel successfully objected. Plaintiffs counsel argued that the
prior lawsuits were relevant evidence as "[i]t shows that he has this ongoing
phenomena of negligent care and treatment., 75 The trial court rejected the
76
position of plaintiff's counsel, but denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the Court of Special
Appeals affirmed.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the prejudicial impact of the
reference to prior lawsuits in the plaintiffs opening statement outweighed the
The court honed in on the
curative value of the trial court's jury instruction.
lawsuits against the
negligence
medical
prior
of
effort to introduce evidence
defendant physician and stated:
There could be any number of reasons why Dr. Lai was sued, and not
all, if any, of them may have been legitimate. The fact of prior litigation
has little, if any, relevance to whether he violated the applicable
standard of care in the immediate case. The admission of evidence of
the fact finder in its quest, tends to excite its
prior suits, instead of aiding
79
it.
mislead
and
prejudice
The court stated that prior lawsuits would constitute prohibited propensity
evidence. In closing, the Maryland Court of Appeals held "that mention by the
plaintiff in opening statement in a medical malpractice jury trial of prior
malpractice litigation brought by third parties against the defendant doctor is
unduly and highly prejudicial and ordinarily shall result, upon proper objection
and motion, in a mistrial." 81 The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the
82
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and ordered a new trial.
of prior
evidence
with
An effort to cross-examine the physician defendant
83
of this
example
A
simple
lawsuits against the physician is similarly improper.
that in
is
it
true
improper tactic is demonstrated with a question such as: "Doctor,
84
times?"
your career, you have been sued for medical malpractice six or eight

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at241.
77. Id. at 241-42.
78. Id. at 244,248-49.
79. Id. at 247 (footnote omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 248 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 249.
83. See Persichini v. William Beaumont Hosp., 607 N.W.2d 100, 105-06 (Mich. Ct. App.
1999).
84. Id. at 103.
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This effort is designed to introduce propensity evidence and to attack the
defendant's credibility. 85 "Mere unproven accusations of malpractice stated in a
be used as a basis for attacking a physician's knowledge and
complaint cannot
' 86
credibility."
V.

EVIDENCE OF PHYSICIAN TREATMENT OF OTHER PATIENTS-INADMISSIBLE

There is substantial jurisprudence that supports the notion that evidence of a
physician defendant's treatment of other patients is inadmissible to prove a
physician's negligence in a particular instance. 87 It is fair to suggest that this
jurisprudence reflects the general policy of Rule 404, and similar state
evidentiary rules, to focus the jury on the case at bar and exclude evidence of the

treatment of other patients. A review of this jurisprudence follows.
Evidence of the treatment of other patients, when offered by the defendant

physician to show a history of successful treatment should be excluded. 88 This is
true irrespective of whether the testimony is provided by the defendant physician
or physician witnesses called by the defendant physician. 89 Evidence of the
treatment of other patients "entirely disconnected from the treatment" of the
subject patient, "whether the result was good or bad," is inadmissible. 90

85. Id. at 105 (citing Heshelman v. Lombardi, 454 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990))
(discussing why prior acts should not be admitted).
86. Id. (quoting Heshelman, 454 N.W.2d at 609).
87. See, e.g., Buford v. Howe, 10 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of other surgeries performed by the surgeon
on the basis that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed the probative value, if any, on
punitive damages claim); Hinson v. Clairemont Cmty. Hosp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 503, 510 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding evidence of physician's performance in medical school and prior employment
termination properly excluded), disapproved of on other grounds by Alexander v. Superior Court,
859 P.2d 96, 100, 102 (Cal. 1993); Baker v. Hancock, 63 N.E. 323, 324 (Ind. App. 1902) (finding
physician's submission of evidence indicating his prior success with a certain cancer treatment was
inadmissible for the purposes of establishing his competency); Lund v. McEnerney, 495 N.W.2d
730, 734 (Iowa 1993) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that the defendant
doctor had, subsequent to the plaintiff's procedure, caused injuries to one or two other patients
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how these later injuries related to her injury); Cerniglia v.
French, 816 So. 2d 319, 323-25 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the testimony of two previous
patients of a doctor being sued in connection to a surgery was neither proof of medical malpractice,
nor proof that doctor lacked necessary knowledge or skill, and thus was not relevant where all
experts who testified admitted the fact that a cerebral spinal fluid leak did not by itself prove that the
doctor negligently performed the surgery); Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 177 (N.D. 1994)
(holding that the trial court's refusal to admit evidence regarding the defendant doctor's settlement
of a recent lawsuit based on the same procedure was proper as its admission would have injected a
collateral matter into the trial and confused the jury); Rayburn v. Day, 268 P. 1002, 1005-06 (Or.
1928) (finding surgeon's statement to the plaintiff's sister that it was not the first time the surgeon
had left a sponge in a patient's abdominal section was inadmissible as evidence of the defendant's
negligence in the specific action).
88. See Baker, 63 N.E. at 324.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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When the plaintiff offers evidence of the defendant physician's treatment of
other patients to prove that the defendant has the propensity for negligence, that
offer of evidence should be refused.91 It is well established that "[a] party cannot
establish his opponent's negligence by offering proof that at some other time he
committed a similar act; similar accidents occasioned by a party at another time
are not admissible to show his negligence upon the occasion under inquiry.,,92
The defendant physician's treatment of another93 patient would not be "probative
of the degree of his care" to the subject patient.
An excellent recent example of the appropriate exclusion of evidence of a
defendant9Physician's prior treatment of other patients is reported in Bair v.
Callahan. Bair involved a medical negligence action against an orthopedic
surgeon. 95 The treatment of the patient "included a spinal surgery involving
placement of pedicle screws and rods into [the plaintiffs] back. ' 96 The jury
returned a verdict for the defendant physician and the plaintiffs sought a new
trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 based, in part, on the trial
court's exclusion
of evidence focused on the defendant's treatment of other
97
patients.

The proposed evidence of the defendant's surgical treatment of other
patients was to be offered by testimony of the defendant, the plaintiffs' expert
witness, and another treating surgeon. 98 The evidence related to similar surgical99
procedures performed on four patients, each of whom had sued the defendant.
Two of the cases were pending and two had been settled.1'° All of the cases
made similar claims, "alleg[ing] that [the defendant] committed medical
malpractice during back surgeries by misplacing pedicle screws and failing to
remove misplaced screws.'I
The plaintiffs' counsel in Bair and the other four
10 2
cases were identical.
The defendant moved in limine to exclude any evidence of his treatment of
the other patients. 103 The "[p]laintiffs opposed [the defendant's] motions in
limine, seeking to introduce such evidence under Rule 404(b) or, alternatively,

91.
92.

See Rayburn v. Day, 268 P. 1002, 1005-06 (Or. 1928).
Id. at 1005 (citing Davis v. Oregon & Cal. R.R. Co., 8 Or. 172, 174 (1879); 4 CHARLES

FREDERICK CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 3209, at 4447

(1913)) (affirming the trial court's decision to sustain the defendant's objection to a question asked
by the plaintiff finding that the question was intended to elicit evidence of the defendant physician's
statement that "[tihis is the second time this happened to me in twenty-four years' practice").
93. Kunnanz v. Edge, 515 N.W.2d 167, 171 (N.D. 1994).
94. 775 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (D.S.D. 2011).
95. Id.at 1166.
96. Id.at 1165.
97. Id.at 1165-66.
98. Id. at 1166-67.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 367

for impeachment purposes under Rule 608, or as habit evidence under Rule
406. "1 The trial court reserved ruling on these matters, but at trial "did not
permit Plaintiffs to ask these witnesses any Jquestions concerning [the
defendant's] treatment of [the other four patients]."
The plaintiffs argued that the "evidence of [the defendant's] inability to
correctly perform other pedicle screw back surgeries ...is relevant to establish
his lack of knowledge and competence to safely perform such surgeries and,
therefore, satisfies the Eighth Circuit requirements for admission under Rule
404(b)." 1°6 Upon deciding the motion, the trial court cited the Eighth Circuit's
Rule 404(b) admissibility test: "The evidence must be 1) relevant to a material
issue; 2) similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the charged crime; 3)
supported by sufficient evidence; and 4) such
10 7 that its potential prejudice does not
substantially outweigh its probative value."
The trial court alluded to application of this test but then focused its analysis
on Rule 404(b)(2) and its reference to "knowledge." 10 8 Although other acts
evidence may be relevant to prove knowledge, plaintiffs' claim involved the
defendant's alleged lack of knowledge, 1°9 a topic not included in Rule
404(b)(2). 110 The court noted that the defendant-surgeon had the requisite
knowledge, but "the real question was whether [he] applied his knowledge
competently in placing pedicle screws in [the plaintiffs] back and determining
whether the screws were properly placed."" I
The trial court concluded that plaintiffs effort to introduce other acts
evidence offered mere propensity evidence which is prohibited by Rule
404(b)(1).112 It characterized plaintiffs' strategy as follows:
Plaintiffs' desire to introduce such other acts evidence ran more to
showing lack of competence or care-that is, malpractice-with respect
to other patients. From such evidence, the jury could then infer that [the
defendant] had a propensity to commit malpractice by misplacing
pedicle screws and thus may or perhaps must have committed similar
malpractice in the surgery to [the plaintiff]. However, Rule 404(b) bars
the use of evidence of other alleged wrongs to show, circumstantially,
action in conformity therewith. Thus, the legitimate probative value of

104. Id.
105. Id. at 1166-67.
106. Id. at 1170.
107. Id. (quoting Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, 569 F. Supp. 2d 841, 848 (N.D. Iowa
2008)).
108. Id. at 1170-71.
109. Id. at 1171.
110. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (providing that evidence of other acts may be admissible to
prove knowledge).
111. Bair, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
112. Id.
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the preferred other acts 11evidence
to show "knowledge" or lack of
3
"knowledge" was limited.

The motion for a new trial was denied t4 This logic would apply to
proposed evidence of defendant's treatment of patients subsequent to the
treatment provided to the patient at issue.' 15 However, a showing of subsequent
similar injuries caused by the defendant physician could yield a different
result. 1 6

A trial court may correctly exclude evidence offered by a plaintiff consisting
of testimony of a defendant physician's former patients in an effort to prove that

the physician lacked the knowledge or skill to perform the procedure involved. n7

Again, the trial court must weigh the potential relevance of similar acts evidence
with the danger of evidentiary prejudice. n 8 A similar analysis applies to
plaintiffs 11proposed evidence of a prior lawsuit against the defendant
physician. 9
VI. EVIDENCE OF PHYSICIAN TREATMENT OF OTHER PATIENTS-ADMISSIBLE

Courts have recognized the propriety of evidence of treatment provided to
other patients in particularly egregious or compelling cases. 120 Even if adopting
an "inclusionary approach ' 121 to admissibility of other acts evidence, the
following cases should be viewed as examples of evidence not merely offered to
prove a propensity to commit negligence.

113. Id. at 1171.
114. Id.
115. See Lund v. McEnerney, 495 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Iowa 1993).
116. See id. at 734 (suggesting that if the plaintiff could relate the other injuries to her own,
those injuries may be admissible).
117. See Buford v. Howe, 10 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1994); Cerniglia v. French, 816 So.
2d 319, 323-24 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
118. See Cerniglia, 816 So. 2d at 324 (applying LA. CODE OF EVID. ART. 403).
119. Gray v. Allen, 677 S.E.2d 862, 867 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Willoughby v. Wilkins,
310 S.E.2d 90, 97-98 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)).
120. See, e.g., Carlton v. Shelton, 722 F.2d 203, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing evidence
detailing prior incidents of "fasting" treatment where other patients similarly died from
malnutrition); Cotgreave v. Pub. Admin. of Imperial Cnty., 443 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972-73 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1981) (holding that evidence of prior operations was admissible for "the purpose of proving a
common plan or scheme to perform unnecessary and contraindicated surgery on plaintiff'),
dismissed in part, aff'd in part,456 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Siuda v. Howard, No. C000656, 2002 WL 946188, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (noting that the trial court did not
err in allowing into evidence plaintiff's expert testimony because under the Ohio Rule of Evidence
404(b), his comment was related to showing the defendant's motive to perform unnecessary
surgeries); Farr v. Wright, 833 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that evidence of
prior cases of discitis in doctor's patients was admissible due to the high rate of incidents in a two
month span and the extreme rarity of the condition without the breach of sterile techniques).
121. See Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 992 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing admission of
evidence as long as it is not admitted to show propensity).
122. See id. (quoting United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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123
Certainly, a case that qualifies as unique and bizarre is Carlton v. Shelton.
In Carlton, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered negligence and gross
negligence claims against two chiropractic physicians.124 These chiropractors
operated a "health school" which "encourage[d] the practice of extended fasting
for the treatment ' 1of
numerous illnesses."'' 25 The patient suffered from
"ulcerative colitis.' 26 Twenty-nine days following admission to the health
school, the patient "died of severe dehydration, malnutrition, and aspiration
pneumonitis," weighing sixty-two pounds less than he had weighed on
admission. 127
The plaintiff was the patient's widow and she claimed both negligence and
gross negligence in the treatment of her husband. 28 Following a jury trial, a
court admitted
verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff.129 The trial
"evidence of prior, similar deaths" at the defendants' facility. 130
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the defendants "literally
allowed [the patient] to starve to death," and highlighted "[t]he deteriorated state
of [the patient's] condition" by13 the time he was transferred to a hospital for

"competent medical assistance."

1

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court properly
admitted evidence of the deaths of three other patients. 32 They also died of
"extended fasting" at the hands of the defendant chiropractor, having suffered
extreme weight loss, dehydration, and starvation'33-although the court of
appeals opinion does not state that these patients were admitted to the facility for
treatment of colitis.
The court held that the evidence of unsuccessful treatment of the other
patients by the defendant was relevant to the "defendant's notice, magnitude of
the danger involved, [or] the defendant's ability to correct a known
[condition]." 134 Finally, the court of appeals noted that:

123. 722 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1984).
124. Id. at 204.
125. Id. at 203. For additional tales of chiropractic woe, see generally GEORGE J. WAGNER,
II,CHIROPRAcTIC: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (Stephen Barrett ed. 1995), and PAUL BENEDETTI
& WAYNE MACPHAIL, SPIN DOCTORS: THE CHIROPRACTIC INDUSTRY UNDER EXAMINATION

(2002) (discussing questionable practices of the industry).
126. Carlton, 722 F.2d at 204. Ulcerative colitis is an idiopathic inflammatory bowel disease.
Stephen R. Gulliford & Jimmy K. Limdi, Acute Severe Ulcerative Colitis: Timing Is Everything, 87
POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 215, 215 (2011).
127. Carlton, 722 F.2d at 204 (stating that the patient entered treatment weighing around 192
pounds and died weighing only 130 pounds).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 205.
132. Id. at 206-07.
133. Id. at 206.
134. Id. (quoting Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The evidence presented ...demonstrated that the three prior deaths

occurred under shockingly similar circumstances and from virtually
identical causes. This evidence undoubtedly was probative on the issue
of [the defendant's] gross negligence. The evidence proved that she was
aware of the grave circumstances in which she had placed [the patient],
had knowledge of the probability of death, and repeatedly ignored these
patients' need for competent medical assistance. More relevant
evidence of her wanton and reckless disregard for the welfare of her
patients cannot be fathomed. While the evidence certainly was
prejudicial ' 1to
[the defendant], its admission did not constitute "unfair
35
prejudice."
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the defendant chiropractor was not
practicig 7chiropractic medicine

136

while engaging in "the practice of extended

fasting.
The unorthodox nature of the treatment might have influenced the
trial court to admit the evidence of the failed treatment of other patients.
Although the court of appeals did not undertake a Rule 404(b) analysis, the
Carlton facts would qualify as Rule 404(b)(2) non-propensity evidence. 1.8
In Farr v. Wright,139 the Court of Appeals of Texas reviewed a jury verdict
in favor of a defendant physician against whom negligence was claimed in his
performance and treatment of complications arising from a discogram, "a
diagnostic procedure involving entry of a needle into the inner-space between the
vertebrae in the back" used to inject dye and then take x-rays. 14 Following this
procedure, the patient got an infection, suffering discitis, "an inflammation of the
disc spaces most commonly caused by infection, although it is also' 4associated
1
with an allergic reaction to the dye, a broken needle, or other causes."'
The pre-trial discovery process revealed information about the defendant
physician's practice history, which, if admissible, would be highly prejudicial
evidence. 142 During the short time the defendant treated the plaintiff, the
defendant "experienced three or four cases of discitis.''143The defendant "had
performed between thirty and fifty discograms" during his brief "career of three

135. Id. at 206-07.
136. Id. at 205.
137. Id. at 203.
138. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(2).
139. 833 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
140. Id. at 598. See John S. Collis, Jr. & W. James Gardner, Lumbar Discography: An
Analysis of One Thousand Cases, 19 J. NEUROSURGERY 452, 452-53 (1962) (describing the steps
involved in discography).
141. Farr,833 S.W.2d at 598 n.1. See generally O.L. Osti et al., Discitis After Discography,
72-B J. BONE AND JOINT SURGERY 271 (1990) (discussing the role of prophylactic antibiotics when
administered at the time of discography).
142. Farr,833 S.W.2d at 598-99 (citing TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 403).
143. Id. at 598.
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to four years." 144 The defendant's patients suffered post-discography discitis at a
rate much higher than reported studies. 145 The plaintiffs expert physician
sought to use this information to support his opinions that the defendant
"consistently breached sterile technique during this period, and ... breached
sterile technique when he treated [the plaintiff]," and that the defendant
"negligently failed to diagnose [the plaintiffs] condition."' 146 The defendant
sought, and was granted, a motion in limine to prohibit the plaintiff "from
admitting evidence of this series of other cases of discitis."' 147 The trial court
further did not allow plaintiffs expert physician 48to base his opinions on the
discitis suffered by other patients of the defendant.
The Court of Appeals of Texas referred to Texas law that recognizes the
admissibility of other accidents or events "to prove that a similar incident
occurred, provided that the circumstances between the incidents are reasonably
similar. ' Here, the other incidents of discitis occurred within a short period of
time following the same procedure performed by the defendant, and, due to the
rarity of the condition, supported the claim that the defendant did not utilize a
sterile technique.' so The court concluded that the evidence of discitis suffered by
the defendant's other patients was "relevant to prove knowledge of prior cases of
discitis, and therefore an increased probability that the dangerous condition
reoccurred in [the plaintiff]., 15' The court stated that it was also relevant to
prove that defendant's procedural technique was negligent, that he negligently
failed to discover the error in technique, and that he negligently failed to
diagnose the complication. 52 The trial court's judgment on the verdict was
reversed and a new trial was ordered. 153
Although Farrprovides an example of the use of prior unfortunate patient
outcomes as non-propensity evidence contemplated by Rule 404(b)(2), it is
problematic. Physicians routinely perform procedures on a variety of patients
with a variety of illnesses, and these procedures carry risks of complications.
Specialists may perform many procedures and must expect some less than
satisfactory outcomes. It is difficult to know how many complications must

144. Id. at 598-99.
145. Id. at 599.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 601 (citing Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co. v. May, 600 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex. 1980) (per
curium); John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)).

150. Id. at 598-99.
151. Id. at 602 (footnote omitted) ("The number of discitis cases was high compared to the
expected number of complications. Thus, five cases was a very large number of incidents during a
two-month period.").
152. Id. at 602-03.
153. id. at 603.
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occur over a specified period of time to evidence a Rule 404(b)(2) pattern or
knowledge. 154 Therefore, the Farranalysis should be used with caution.
In Siuda v. Howard,155 a state counterpart of Rule 404(b)(2) was utilized by
the Court of Appeals of Ohio to approve the introduction into evidence of a
physician's "motive to perform medically unnecessary surgeries; his knowledge
as an ophthalmologist; and an absence of mistake or accident. '
In Siuda,
consolidated cases were brought against an ophthalmologist, asserting "similar
claims for medical negligence, negligence, lack of informed consent, fraud,
conspiracy to defraud ... battery, and punitive damages resulting from [the
defendant's] care in performing or recommending surgery for glaucoma and/or
cataracts. 157
At trial, the court admitted into evidence the following testimony of another
treating physician who had attended to patients treated by defendant:
I just want to make a couple of comments on the cataracts. Just a
few patients, I won't comment on.
I've shown you the anatomy of the diagnostic approach. Forget the
indications for surgery. Forget the indications when you see [the
defendant's] cases in a moment. Look at the size of that. There are no
significant cataracts. And he's operating needlessly.
... I have seen four of [the defendant's] patients with permanent
serious complications. One resulted in blindness.158
As to the testimony regarding the complications suffered by defendant's
other patients, the court found this admissible as non-propensity other acts
evidence. 159 The evidence tended to prove the defendant's "motive to perform
medically unnecessary surgeries," as well as his "knowledge" and "absence of
mistake." 1 6 In essence, this evidence tends to reveal the inability of a physician
to correctly perform a procedure, and a practice of performing unnecessary
161
surgery.
Another approach to the admission of prior acts evidence against a defendant
physician concerns diagnostic abilities and continuous negligent conduct. In

154. See, e.g., John Deere Co. v. May, 773 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
thirty-four prior incidents could be admitted to show a 404(b)(2) pattern); Farr,833 S.W.2d at 602
(finding that five prior incidents could be admitted to show a 404(b)(2) pattern).
155. No. C-000656, 2002 WL 946188 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002).
156. Id. at *6-7 (citing OHIO R. EvID. 404(B)).
157. Id. at *1.
158. Id. at *6.
159. Id. at *6-7 (citing OHIo R. EVID. 404(B)).
160. Id. at *7; see also Cotgeave v. Pub. Admin. of Imperial Cnty., 443 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (admitting evidence of physician's prior operations to prove a "common plan or
scheme to perform unnecessary and contraindicated surgery"), dismissed in part,aff'd in part, 456
N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
161. Siuda, 2002 WL 946188, at *7, *11.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 63: 367

Adams v. Dunn,162 the Supreme Court of Oregon considered a medical
malpractice claim against physicians who attended to a child who "died... of
peritonitis resulting from an undiagnosed case of appendicitis."1 63 A verdict was
returned for the defendants. 164 Here, the trial court refused plaintiffs' request for
a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit
authored by the parent of another child "who had read about the Adams trial in
the newspaper and then had called plaintiffs' attorney."' 165 The affidavit
recounted the events surrounding the treatment of the affiant's daughter by one
of the defendants, suggesting that the defendant had 66failed to diagnose
appendicitis in a fashion strikingly similar to the case at bar.1
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon viewed this "evidence as material
to the issue of negligent misdiagnosis."' 16 It approved the admission of prior
acts evidence "to prove the existence of a continuing course of negligent
conduct, that the course of conduct is in fact dangerous, or that the defendant had
notice of its dangerous character, provided that the prior acts occurred under
similar circumstances."168 The court believed that the affidavit provided this

evidence. 169
The logic of this opinion is troublesome. The Supreme Court of Oregon
noted that the affidavit contradicted defendants' contention "that their diagnosis
and treatment of [the patient at issue] was proper practice"' 7 and suggested "that
defendants engaged in a continual course of negligent conduct with regard to
misdiagnosing appendicitis in children and, most importantly, that defendants
had notice of the dangerous character of the very symptoms which they
misdiagnosed."' 7' This, of course, creates a slippery slope for admission of prior
acts evidence. Here, the affidavit referred to one other child treated by
defendants in a similar fashion to the Adams child. 172 Is that a sufficient track
record to implicate Rule 404(b)(2) non-propensity evidence? It seems as if this
logic would lead to the admission of evidence targeted by a rule excluding
propensity evidence. If a physician experienced a similar unfortunate result with
another patient, the physician might be susceptible to the admission of prior acts
evidence, a rather harsh price to pay.

162. 581 P.2d 939 (Or. 1978), withdrawn, 587 P.2d 466.
163. Id. at 941. See generally Marshall Z. Schwartz et al., Management of Perforated
Appendicitis in Children: The Controversy Continues, 197 ANNALS OF SURGERY 407 (Apr. 1983)
(discussing a study of the protocol for managing a perforated appendix).
164. Adams, 581 P.2d at 941.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 944.
168. Id. (citing Rader v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 494 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Or. 1972)).
169. Id. at 944-45.
170. Id. at 944.
171. Id. at 944-45.
172. Id. at 943.
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Finally, there is authority to support the admission into evidence of
physician treatment of other patients in order to prove fraud.' 73 In Buford v.
Howe, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the judgment entered as a
matter of law for the defendant physician at the close of the plaintiffs case in
chief. 174 The trial court had earlier entered an order in limine prohibiting "any
testimony or medical records concerning the treatment of patients other than the
plaintiff."' 175 Plaintiff "argue[d] that evidence of the other surgeries is essential
to prove that [the defendant] fraudulently
induced women to submit to
176
unnecessary surgeries for financial gain."'
The court of appeals approved the exclusion of the evidence because the
plaintiff did not properly allege a fraud claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b). 17 7 However, the court noted that if the plaintiff amended her
complaint to conform to the proposed proof, the plaintiff could produce evidence
of the defendant's treatment
of other patients in support of a fraudulent
78
misrepresentation claim. 1
VII. OTHER CATEGORIES OF PHYSICIAN CONDUCT EVIDENCE

A.

Alteration of Medical Records

The alteration of medical records is an unfortunate, known phenomenon in
the medical profession. 179 It likely occurs as a defense mechanism after a
medical negligence claim is filed. 80 Records alteration likely relates to
physician honesty, a credibility issue, but it also may "raise[] questions about the
quality of care that a physician rendered."''
Therefore, evidence of altered
records may influence a jury to believe that the offending physician would not
alter records unless medical negligence was committed.
Evidence of records
alteration is powerful and potentially devastating.
In Schwochow v. Chung,183 the jury had returned a defense verdict in favor
of a pediatrician who allegedly failed to diagnose an infection, which caused
injury to, and the death of, a child. 184 The trial court had entered an order in

173. Buford v. Howe, 10 F.3d 1184, 1188 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994).
174. Id. at 1187. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (setting forth the conditions required in order
for a court to grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law).
175. Buford, 10 F.3d at 1187.
176. Id.at 1188.
177. Id.
178. Id.at 1188 n.5.
179. See John Zen Jackson & Ann Marie Vaurio, The Entanglements of Altered Medical
Records, FOR THE DEF., July 2010 at 57, 57; Leonard Berlin, Alteration of Medical Records, 168
AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1405, 1405 (1997).
180. Berlin, supra note 179, at 1406.
181. Jackson & Vaurio, supra note 179, at 58.
182. Id. at 60.
183. 657 N.E.2d 312 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
184. Id. at 312-13.
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limine "prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing.., any evidence [t]hat the words
'no fever' were added to [the defendant's] medical chart for [the child] on a date
other than November 16, 1990. " 185 The trial court reasoned that the altered chart
was offered as impermissible character evidence and was not an appropriate
subject for attack on the defendant. 186 The Ohio Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that evidence of record alteration by the defendant physician was
"relevant to the ultimate issue of the adequacy of the care that [the defendant]
provided" and, therefore, was appropriate ammunition for attack of the
defendant. 187 In such a situation, all available88 versions of the physician's
medical record would be admissible in evidence. 1
It should be noted, however, that a physician's history of altered records,
many years prior to the claim that is the subject of a medical negligence action,
which does not involve altered records, should be inadmissible. 18 That evidence
would constitute character evidence, which "tempts the jury to base its decision
on emotion and to reward good people or punish bad people, rather than to
render a verdict based upon the facts before them."' 19
B. PoorPerformance in Medical Education and Training

If a physician fails to complete a residency program or other training, the
fact of this occurrence is likely admissible evidence because it relates to "the
possession of knowledge and skill portion of the standard of care."19' However,
more specific details of a physician's education and training, such as reasons
for
92
incomplete education, would constitute inadmissible character evidence. 1
C. Defendant Physician'sFailureto Achieve Board Certification

Board certification is a highly sought status among physicians. 93 A large
percentage "of licensed physicians [hold] a valid certificate. '
The

185. Id. at 315.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 316.
188. See Ruperd v. Ryan, 683 N.E.2d 166, 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). See generally Hinson v.
Clairemont Cmty. Hosp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 503, 510-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that evidence
sought to be introduced was "marginal" and not relevant to the adequacy of the defendant
physician's care), disapproved of on other grounds by Alexander v. Superior Court, 859 P.2d 96
(Cal. 1993).
189. Cf. Hinson, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 510 (stating that prior negligence in medical treatment is
inadmissible to show general skill of a physician).
190. Davis v. Rudisill, 706 S.E.2d 784, 789 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
191. Hinson, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
192. Id.
193. Troyen A. Brennan et al., The Role of Physician Specialty Board Certification Status in
the Quality Movement, 292 JAMA 1038, 1042 (2004) (stating that patients "highly favor what the
credential of certification represents").
194. Id. at 1039.
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requirements for board certification of the member boards of the American
Board of Medical Specialties include "between 3 and 6 years of training in an
accredited training program and a passing score on a rigorous cognitive
195
examination," and some of the member boards have additional requirements.
Board certification is suggestive of the ability to provide quality care. 196 It is
board
noteworthy, however, that hospitals do not consistently require
1 97
certification as a condition precedent to the receipt of staff privileges.
What, then, is the probative value of a defendant physician's failure to
achieve board certification? Is it relevant to the defendant's knowledge base,
understanding of the standard of care, or ability to practice medicine? Is it a
professional historical fact, a character flaw so to speak, which would distract the
jury and influence it to believe that a non-board certified physician was likely
negligent in a specific situation?
In Illinois, for example, the law is quite clear that if a defendant physician
does not offer standard of care testimony in his or her own defense, that
physician's failure to achieve board certification is inadmissible. 198 If, however,
the defendant physician testifies as to the standard of care, that is tantamount to
expert testimony and "evidence as to [the physician's] age, practice, and like
matters relating to his qualifications as an expert is admissible," including "the
failure to pass board certification examinations." 199 The Supreme Court of
Alaska has taken a different approach, noting that the failure to achieve board
certification could constitute ammunition for impeachment, but that the
' 2 °°
was outweighed by "its potential for causing prejudice and
probative value
confusion.

Prohibiting the use of non-board certification against a defendant physician
who does not give standard of care testimony is a sensible approach. 201 Board
certification is not licensure. 202 A physician need not have obtained board
certification to practice medicine. 203 Therefore, it is appropriate to exclude
evidence of non-board certification when the defendant physician will not
provide standard of care or expert testimony.

195. Id. at 1040.
196. See id. at 1042 (stating that reasonable empirical evidence suggests that certification will
improve quality of care).
197. Gary L. Freed et al., Use of Board Certification and Recertification in Hospital
Privileging, 144 ARCH. OF SURGERY 746, 750 (2009).
198. Sbarboro v. VolIala, 911 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Rockwood v. Singh,
630 N.E.2d 873, 875 (111.App. Ct. 1993)).
199. Id. at 567.
200. Marsingill v. O'Malley, 58 P.3d 495, 502 (Alaska 2002).
201. See, e.g., Jones v. Rallos, 869 N.E.2d 124, 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) ("[Wlhere the
defendant's testimony is not used to show the standards of medical care, but is used to relate to the
jury what occurred before, during, and after treatment, reference to defendant's board-certification
status is properly barred." (citing Rockwood, 630 N.E.2d at 876)) appealdenied,judgment vacated,
873 N.E.2d 943 (Ill. 2007).
202. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 59 (explaining the separate processes).
203. Id. (providing that licensing statutes govern entry into the licensed professions).
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D. Defendant Physician'sMedical License Suspension or Other Discipline

Medical licensure is "governed by state law through the states' authority
under the police power to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the
community," and is a component of "quality-control. ,,204 If a physician's license
to practice medicine has been suspended, that disciplinary measure may
implicate the physician's knowledge of the standard of care and ability to deliver
appropriate medical care. 20 5 Therefore, the admissibility analysis of a medical
license suspension may be similar to the analysis discussed in Part VII.C of this
Article regarding failure to achieve board certification.
An excellent illustration of this point is the Supreme Court of South
Dakota's opinion in Mosseau v. Schwartz.206 In Mosseau, the plaintiff sued the
defendant neurosurgeon
arising from the defendant's
....for medical negligence
207
treatment of plaintiff's spinal stenosis.
The defendant had experienced prior
malpractice claims and was the subject of disciplinary proceedings instituted by
the South Dakota Board of Medical and Osteopathic Examiners (Board)
regarding the malpractice claims. 2°9 Ultimately, the defendant entered into a
stipulation with the Board resulting in the "probationary status" of his license to
practice medicine. 21 The conditions of the defendant's license probation were
as follows:
[R]equired to complete one year of "advanced clinical training" in
neurosurgery and a minimum of three months in neuroradiology. His
practice.., was restricted to only that required to fulfill his training
requirement. Further... for a period of five years, following the
successful completion of his training, [he] was prohibited from solo
practice .... 211

204. Id.
205. See Neely v. Wilson, 331 S.W.3d 900, 907 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that the medical
board suspended the physician's license because of the physician's "inability to practice medicine
with reasonable care and safety to patients").
206. 756 N.W.2d 345, 360-62 (S.D. 2008).
207. Id. at 347-49. See generally James N. Weinstein et al., Surgical Versus Nonsurgical
Therapy for Lumbar Spinal Stenosis, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 794, 795 (2008) ("Spinal stenosis is a
narrowing of the spinal canal with encroachment on the neural structures by surrounding bone and
soft tissue. Patients typically present with radicular leg pain or with neurogenic claudication (pain
in the buttocks or legs on walking or standing that resolves with sitting down or lumbar flexion).").
208. 'The mission of the [Board] is to protect the health and welfare of the state's citizens by
assuring that only qualified doctors of medicine . . . are licensed to practice in South Dakota."
SOUTH DAKOTA BD. OF MED. & OSTEOPATHIC EXAM'RS, http://www.sdbmoe.gov (last
visited Dec. 16, 2011).
209. Mosseau, 756 N.W.2d at 349.
210. Id. at 350.
211. Id.
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The discipline imposed upon defendant's license to practice medicine
carried with it reporting requirements. 21 2 The "reason given for [defendant's]
license probation was 'Malpractice. -213 This stipulation was excluded from
2 14
evidence by the trial court pursuant to defendant's motion in limine.

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant
215

neurosurgeon.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota determined that the trial court erred by

excluding the stipulation from evidence. 216 This stipulation did not constitute
217
prohibited evidence of a prior act to prove negligence in conformity therewith.
Instead, the "[s]tipulation as evidence of [the defendant's] deficiency in

knowledge and skill ... was relevant to [the defendant's] ability to meet the
applicable standard of care that required him to have and to use the skill and care
of that ordinarily possessed and used by neurosurgeons under similar
circumstances. 2 18
A defendant physician who is practicing medicine subject to a license
condition at the time of plaintiffs treatment may be required to endure the
admission in evidence of that condition. 219 An Ohio court found a prior thirty
day medical license suspension and a subsequent probationary period related to
billing practices inadmissible as irrelevant and as inappropriate character

evidence, suggesting the propensity for dishonesty. ° It may be argued that the
probative value of a license suspension is simply "greatly outweighed by the
danger of prejudice and confusion of the issues.",221 Even if a prior temporary
license suspension in a given case relates to a physician's character for
truthfulness or222credibility, its probative value may not survive the Rule 403
balancing test.
Should a defendant physician give standard of care testimony at trial, this
testimony likely transforms the physician from a fact witness to an expert
witness.

The defendant physician's prior license suspension would be

admissible to challenge his or her qualifications as an expert witness.223

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 349.
215. Id. at 350.
216. ld. at 363.
217. Id. at 355; see S.D.C.L. § 19-12-5 (representing the South Dakota equivalent of FED. R.
EVID. 404(b)).
218. Mosseau, 756 N.W.2d at 355.
219. Lambert v. Wilkinson, No. 2007-A-0032, 2008 WL 2404736, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 13, 2008) (discussing whether licensure evidence is admissible).
220. Id. at *6-7.
221. Dudley v. Humana Hosp. Corp., 817 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
222. King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding evidence of license suspension
inadmissible despite the Eighth Circuit's inclusionary approach to Rule 404(b)).
223. Hill v. St. Onge, No. 2:06-CV-329, 2009 WL 2833145, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1,
2009); Greene v. Beebe Med. Ctr., 663 A.2d 487, 487 (Del. 1995) (unpublished disposition).
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The Supreme Court of Missouri has considered a Rule 608-like problem
concerning the cross-examination of a defendant physician regarding his prior
224
medical license suspensions. In Mitchell v. Kardesch, the defendant physician
falsely answered an interrogatory directed to a prior license suspension, asking
the defendant to "[s]tate whether
,,,226
.. .any professional license held by [him] ha[d]

22 5 The defendant simply "answered 'No.226
ever been suspended or revoked."
The defendant had suffered medical license suspensions in Missouri and New
York.227 He ultimately admitted this fact at his deposition. 228 At trial, the trial
court prohibited the plaintiff from cross-examining the defendant about the
Missouri license suspension, "and from introducing either the false
[interrogatory] answer or [his] deposition testimony in which he admitted his
''22
1 The trial "court permitted
answer was inaccurate and sought to justify it.
counsel to ask [the defendant] only a single question: whether his interrogatory
answers generally were truthful." 230 The defendant answered "yes" to that
231
that the
Plaintiffs "[clounsel
question in court.
' 232 was prohibited from showing
doctor's... answer was not accurate.

The Missouri Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by limiting this
effort at cross-examination. 3 3 The defendant physician was subject to cross-

examination regarding "specific instances of his ...conduct that speak to
his.., own character for truth or veracity, even where the issue inquired about is
not material to the substantive issues in the case. ' , 234 Here, the defendant's
answer to the interrogatory was false, as was his in-court testimony regarding the

224. Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). Compare id. at 670
(formalizing the Missouri common-law rule that "extrinsic evidence" regarding defendant's prior
conduct is admissible "where the relevance and probativeness of such evidence on the issue of the
party's character for truth and veracity is so great that it would deprive the jury of evidence highly
relevant to is resolution of material issues" if inadmissible), with FED. R. EVID. 608(b):
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule
609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's
conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness. But the
court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified
about.
225. Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 679.
234. Id. at 677.
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truthfulness of his interrogatory answer. 235 The evidence of these false
statements directly related to the defendant's character for truthfulness. 236 These
specific instances of the defendant's conduct were appropriate ammunition for
237
This seems the appropriate approach under Rule 608(b) as
cross-examination.
well.
E. Defendant Physician'sHospitalPrivileges Suspension
Arguably, a prior hospital privileges suspension would involve the same
evidentiary issues as a prior medical license suspension. A physician's ability 23to
control. 8
obtain and keep hospital privileges is also a function of quality
Should the defendant physician provide standard of care testimony, the evidence
239
of a suspension of staff privileges is likely admissible.
It is important to note, however, that physicians may suffer privileges
suspensions for reasons not directly related to patient care. Suspensions may be
imposed for failure to complete medical charts,2 4° or "inability to work in
harmony with other hospital personnel. 24' Under these circumstances, evidence
of suspensions is arguably inadmissible.242
VIII.

PHYSICIAN HABIT

A defendant physician is at risk in medical negligence litigation of having
habit evidence admitted against him, which appears strikingly similar to
The distinction has been
inadmissible character and propensity evidence.
explained by Professor McCormick as follows:
Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or
of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty,
temperance or peacefulness. Habit... is more specific. It denotes
one's regular response to a repeated situation .... A habit ...is the

235. Id. at 674.
236. Id. at 679.
237. See id.
238. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 59-60.
239. See Armstrong v. Hrabal, 87 P.3d 1226, 1232-33, 1239-42 (Wyo. 2004) (noting that the
physician held privileges at three hospitals when discussing his credentials as an expert witness).
240. See Gabaldoni v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp. Ass'n, 250 F.3d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 2001) (involving
a physician lawsuit following the termination of clinical privileges and the denial of an application
for reappointment, and the court refers to "multiple suspensions for failure to complete medical
charts").
241. William M. Copeland & Phyllis E. Brown, Hospital Medical Staff Privilege Issues:
"Brother'sKeeper" Revisited, 17 N. Ky. L. REV. 513, 516 (1990).
242. See Lambert v. Wilkinson, No. 2007-A-0032, 2008 WL 2404736, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 13, 2008) (holding that a physician's license suspension due to billing procedures was
inadmissible).
243. See Gasiorowski v. Hose, 897 P.2d 678, 678-81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
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person's regular practice of resRonding to a particular kind of situation
with a specific type of conduct.
The risk, then, is of evidence that reveals that a defendant physician has a
habit of committing a negligent act.
This precise problem occurred for a defendant anesthesiologist in
Gasiorowski v. Hose. 4 5 Here, a claim was filed alleging that the defendant
"administered an epidural anesthetic to plaintiff.... [and] threaded the epidural
catheter too far into her spinal canal," causing "a246cramping, spasmodic condition
that [had] left [the plaintiff] wheelchair bound."
The case against the anesthesiologist was tried and the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant. 247 The trial court excluded evidence of the
anesthesiologist's suspension of "epidural and on-call privileges
' '248 in response to
several episodes of 'difficulty threading the epidural catheter.
The Arizona Court of Appeals discussed the distinction between
inadmissible character evidence and admissible habit evidence. 249 It noted that
the anesthesiologist "invoked habit or routine practice as a basis for
reconstructing how he probably treated [the plaintiff] .,,250 The court held that
Arizona Rule of Evidence 406 "supported plaintiff s attempt to establish through
the observations of delivery room nurses that [the defendant] had a routine
practice of threading epidural catheters to excessive depth.'" 25 As that evidence
was improperly excluded, the judgment on the defense verdict was reversed and
the case was remanded for a new trial.252
There have been unsuccessful efforts to transform character evidence into
habit evidence. It has been held that the occasional alteration of medical records
by a defendant physician did "not constitute proof of a regular response to253a
repeated, factually specific situation" and did not "rise to the level of habit."
Furthermore, "evidence of one prior incident of alleged failure to advise a patient
of risks does not establish
that defendant has a habit of failing to advise patients
' 254
of the risks of surgery.

244. BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 195, at 322. See, e.g., Reaves v. Mandell, 507 A.2d 807,
810-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (applying this distinction).
245. Gasiorowski, 897 P.2d at 681-82.
246. Id. at 679.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 681-84.
250. Id. at 682. See also Aikman v. Kanda, 975 A.2d 152, 162-65 (D.C. Ct. App. 2009).
251. Gasiorowski, 897 P.2d at 682 (citing ARIZ. R. EVID. 406).
252. Id. at 685.
253. Lambert v. Wilkinson, No. 2007-A-0032, 2008 WL 2404736, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 13, 2008).
254. Cook v. Rontal, 311 N.W.2d 333, 335 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), superseded on other
groundsby Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003).
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Although physicians have been able to use habit evidence defensively, this
may not always hold true. A court may adopt the position that "the relevant
inquiry in a negligence action is not whether a defendant has a habit of
compliance with the type of duty at issue, but whether the defendant breached a
specific duty owed to a plaintiff at a particular time.'255 For example, in a
medical negligence action concerning surgery, the defendant surgeon should not
be permitted to testify as to the number of prior similar procedures performed by
the surgeon without injury. 2 56 Clearly, the historical successful completion of
surgeries does not tend to prove that a surgeon properly performed surgery that
is the subject of litigation. A court should, however, allow physicians to explain
their habit or routine for treating a patient in a certain situation, or explain a
medical chart entry, because physicians may attend to many patients over time
and may simply not recall having given specific treatment on a specific date and
time.
IX. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MEDICAL EXPERT WITNESSES

The testimony of medical expert witnesses is often the focal point of medical
negligence litigation. Crucial to the prosecution and defense of medical
negligence actions is testimony that identifies the medical standard of care257 and
2 58
it.
whether the defendant physician's conduct complied with or deviated from
By definition then, the medical expert witness, when opining on the applicable
standard of care, necessarily testifies as to appropriate or inappropriate care.
The medical expert witness is subject to typical witness cross-examination
relating to bias, prejudice, and credibility. 259 Additionally, when the medical
expert witness is providing standard of care testimony, that expert may be
260
and medical
subject
•261 to cross-examination concerning expert qualifications
The
scope
judgment.
262of cross-examination of "expert witnesses restsmay
be
The issue here, is whether the medical expert in the
trial judge's discretion."

255. Ligon v. Southside Cardiology Assocs., 519 S.E.2d 361, 364 (Va. 1999).
256. John W. Ely et al., Determining the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice: The
Physician's Perspective, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 861, 864-65 (2002).
257. See Witzmann v. Adam, No. 23352, 2011 WL 322642, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2011) (holding that testimony by defendant physician "that never in over 460 surgeries has he
injured a patient's recurrent laryngeal nerve" was inadmissible habit evidence, but was harmless
error).
258. See Karen L. Posner et al., Variation in Expert Opinion in Medical Malpractice Review,
85 J. OFTHE AM. SOC. OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS 1049, 1049 (1996).
259. See FED. R. EvID.608.
260. See Lee Waldman Miller, Cross-Examinationof Expert Witnesses: Dispelling the Aura of
Reliability, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1988).
261. See Cook v. Wiggins, No. 21047-9-I1, 1998 WL 712832, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 21,
1998) (finding that the expert's medical judgment was relevant evidence).
262. BROUN ET AL., supra note 19, § 13, at 36.
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subject to cross-examination
with evidence that relates to prior bad acts, conduct,
263
propensity.
or
A. Medical License Revocation or Limitation
The fact that physicians suffer disciplinary problems is well reported, and
the transgressions are varied. 264 A medical license reprimand, restriction, or
revocation is probative of a physician's credibility and should be an appropriate
subject of expert witness cross-examination, 65 A medical expert should not be
subjected to cross-examination concerning a disciplinary matter pending before a
266
A physician expert who also held a law degree and law
licensing board.
license was not subject to impeachment with evidence that he had been
267
Here, the court was
disciplined as a lawyer by a state bar association.
concerned about "the low esteem in which the public holds lawyers,"2 68 and held
that the discipline issued by the bar association had "no269relevance to [the
physician expert's] credibility as an expert medical witness."
A Louisiana appellate court approved of the exclusion from evidence, a
disciplinary action taken against an expert witness for "ethical violations
associated with his involvement with a patient. '27° The trial court considered
"the remoteness in time of [the expert's] professional transgressions with their
sexual nature," and the appellate court agreed that
271 the disciplinary action "does
not reflect upon [the expert witness's] expertise."
Finally, an appellate court in Illinois considered whether a medical expert's
failure to pass the Illinois
. .. licensing exam was an
. appropriate
.
.subject
272 for crossexamination when the expert held a medical license inFlorida.
The court

263. See FED. R. EVID. 404.
264. See Kohatsu et al., supra note 10, at 653-54; Morrison et al., supra note 9.
265. See Richmond v. Longo, 604 A.2d 374, 378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing to permit defendant's cross-examination regarding the alleged
termination of the expert's surgical privileges and restrictions on his license to practice medicine);
Cetera v. DiFilippo, 934 N.E.2d 506, 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (involving an expert witness subject
to cross-examination regarding a letter of reprimand from the licensing board for failing to diagnose
microhematuria in a patient); Creighton v. Thompson, 639 N.E.2d 234, 239 (111.App. Ct. 1994)
(expert witness subject to cross-examination regarding a license restriction-unable to practice
without supervision); Cook v. Wiggins, No. 210-47-9-11, 1998 WL 712832, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 1999) (license revocation).
266. See Poole v. Univ. of Chi., 542 N.E.2d 746, 750-51 (111.App. Ct. 1989) (refusing to
allow impeachment of a defendant when he denied having pending claims).

267. See Unmack v. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 967 P.2d 783, 785 (Mont. 1998).
268. Id. at 784.
269. Id. at 785.
270. Beaucoudray v. Walsh, 9 So. 3d 916, 928 n.12 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the expert
had been "required to refrain from sexual conduct with patients, attend psychotherapy sessions,
meet quarterly with a monitor, and pay a $1,000 fine along with some other incidental

requirements").
271. Id. at 929.
272. O'Brien v. Meyer, 554 N.E.2d 257, 258 (111.App. Ct. 1989).
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stated that "the existence of a license goes only to the initial qualifying inquiry.
If the witness holds a license in one State, her failure to pass the equivalent
licensing examination in another State should not preclude her from
"scant probative value... was outweighed by its
testifying .... ,,273 The
274
prejudicial impact.
B.

Failureto Achieve Board Certification

A high percentage of licensed physicians are board certified, which patients
generally equate with physician quality. 275 Obtaining board certification requires
at least a period of prior training "and a passing score on a rigorous cognitive
examination. ' 276 Board certification, therefore, presumes a body of knowledge,
277
The
competence, and expertise in an area of specialized medical practice.
failure to pass a board certification exam speaks negatively on a medical expert's
credibility to testify as an expert and is the appropriate subject of crossexamination.

278

C. Termination/Suspensionof Staff Privileges

A physician is able to admit and treat hospital patients "op24 if the
Staff
practitioner has admitting or clinical privileges at that hospital.
privileges are granted to physicians with "membership in the hospital's medical
staff. '2 0 Staff privileges may be curtailed for reasons related to "competency
and quality of care."281 Expert medical witnesses may be cross-examined
a suspension of staff privileges 2 -2 or a termination of
regarding, for example,
28
surgical privileges.

273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Brennan et al., supra note 193, at 1039, 1042.
Id. at 1040.

277. See id. at 1041-42.
278. Kurrack v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 625 N.E.2d 675, 686 (111.App. Ct. 1993); see also Cook v.
Wiggins, No. 21047-9-I1, 1998 WL 712832, at *2-5 (Wash. App. Ct. Aug. 21, 1998).
279. FURROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 97.

280. Id.
281. Id. at 105.

See also JAMES WALKER SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY § 1.03(5) (1985)

(citing JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 124 (1988)) ('The reappointment, renewal or revision of clinical privileges is based
upon information concerning the individual's current licensure, health status, special performance,
judgment and clinical/technical skills as indicated by the results of quality assurances activities and
other reasonable indicators of continuing qualifications.").
282. Whisenhunt v. Zammit, 358 S.E.2d 114,117 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).

283. Richmond v. Longo, 604 A.2d 374, 378-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
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A physician may suffer a staff privilege
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• limitation
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an expert
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care.
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patient
not directly related
witness should not be subject to cross-examination on these topics as they are
unrelated to expertise.
D. Negative PerformanceEvaluation
The medical expert witness is often a practicing physician and, therefore,
could have experienced his or her own professional difficulties. The Court of
Appeals of Ohio in House v. Swann, 285 held that the admission into evidence of
the plaintiff's expert's prior "negative departmental performance evaluation he
received while working at a hospital in Jersey City, New Jersey" may have
hospitals and the medical profession,
contributed to "a potential bias
286 against
which the jury may consider.,
E. PriorLawsuits Against the Expert
There are many reasons why patients contemplate lawsuits against their
physicians. 287 Undoubtedly, some lawsuits will be filed against physicians who
will act as expert witnesses in other cases. Is it appropriate to cross-examine an
expert witness regarding the expert's involvement in litigation as a medical
negligence defendant? This jurisprudence will be explored.
1. Admissible Evidence
There are court opinions that hold permissible the cross-examination of a
defense medical expert with evidence of prior medical negligence actions filed
against the expert on the basis that such evidence is relevant to the expert's bias
or interest.288 This position is dubious. The underlying assumption must be that
when a physician is sued in a medical negligence case, he or she would be
thereafter inclined to testify as an expert only on behalf of defendant physicians.
Allowing cross-examination of a medical expert in this manner could focus the

284. See Gabaldoni v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp. Ass'n., 250 F.3d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 2001)
(discussing physician's suspension for alteration of medical charts); Copeland & Brown, supra note
241, at 516.
285. No. L-09-1232, 2010 WL 3820372 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).
286. Id. at *5 (citing Davis v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 292, 298 (Ohio 1997)).
287. See David A. Fishbain et al., What PatientAttributes Are Associated with Thoughts of
Suing a Physician?, 38 ARCH. OF PHYSICAL MED. AND REHAB. 589, 589 (2007) (suggesting that
there are reasons unassociated with negligence for suing a physician, such as dissatisfaction with the
physician-patient relationship).
288. See, e.g., Underhill v. Stephenson, 756 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1988); Irish v. Gimbel, 691 A.2d
664 (Me. 1997); Willoughby v. Wilkins, 310 S.E.2d 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
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jury on collateral litigation. 289 The better approach, directed at exposing an
expert's bias or conflicted interest, is to use the discovery process to determine
how frequently an expert witness testifies for plaintiffs and defendants, 290 to
learn the expert's income earned from these services, 291 and then to cross292
examine the expert at trial on these matters.
A Connecticut appellate court held that a medical expert for the defense
should be subject to cross-examination regarding a medical negligence claim
filed aainst him involving charges similar to those he was defending as an
expert.
Here, the theory was that the defense expert was required to support
the defendant physician on the standard of care in order to preserve consistency
with his position in the case filed against him. 294 Another approach to this issue
would have been to simply allow cross-examination of the medical expert
witness with any prior inconsistent testimony given in his own case, such as in
his deposition.295 The fact that prior testimony was given in a case filed
against
296
the medical expert could have been the subject of a motion in limine.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, without sufficient
explanation, has approved the cross-examination of a plaintiff's medical expert
"about the fact that he had been a defendant in three medical malpractice
cases. ' 297 The court noted that this cross-examination related to the expert's
qualifications" and "credibility as a witness. ,298
.

2.

Inadmissible Evidence

Other courts, even a Connecticut appellate court, have disapproved the
cross-examination of medical experts about malpractice actions filed against
them.2999 This is simply a better approach to this evidentiary issue. Prior medical
negligence lawsuits against a medical expert do not implicate an untruthful

289. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Propriety of Questioning Expert Witness Regarding
Specific Incidents of Allegations of Expert's Unprofessional Conduct or Professional Negligence,
11 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1993).
290. See Wilson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 513 N.E.2d 443, 445-46 (Il. App. Ct. 1987).
291. See Trower v. Jones, 520 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Il. 1988).
292. Wilson, 513 N.E.2d at 445-46 (citing Sears v. Rutishauser, 466 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Il.
1984)); see Trower, 520 N.E.2d at 300.
293. Hayes v. Manchester Mem'l Hosp., 661 A.2d 123, 125-26 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (citing
Richmond v. Longo, 604 A.2d 374, 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)).
294. Id. at 125.
295. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (providing that prior inconsistent statements are not
hearsay).
296. For a discussion of motions in limine, see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF
ILLINOIS EVIDENCE 27 (8th ed. 2004).
297. Navarro de Cosme v. Hosp. Pavia, 922 F.2d 926, 932-33 (1st Cir. 1991).
298. Id.
299. Locke v. Vanderark, 843 P.2d 27, 31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 783
A.2d 36, 49 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (involving a dental expert); Mazzone v. Holmes, 557 N.E.2d
186, 193 (111.App. Ct. 1990); Wischmeyer v. Schanz, 536 N.W.2d 760,767 (Mich. 1995).
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character. 300 The motive, bias, or interest of an expert witness may be explored
through the use of historical data relating to the frequency of expert testimony
for plaintiffs and defendants, and relating to income derived from testifying as an
expert witness. Furthermore, if a medical expert has given deposition or trial
testimony contradictory to that given in the case at issue, that expert is subject to
Allowing crosscross-examination with prior inconsistent statements.3 °'
examination about prior lawsuits filed against the expert will distract the jury and
undoubtedly create collateral mini-trials. It is a disruptive process which should
be avoided.
X.

CONCLUSION

As the above discussion and examination reveals, the law of evidence is not
always favorable to physician defendants with respect to the admissibility of
prior bad conduct. Although evidence of reputation as a good or bad physician
and evidence of prior lawsuits against the physician defendant is typically, and
properly, inadmissible, courts are receptive to evidence of prior conduct as it
may relate to the defendant physician's knowledge base and the standard of care.
As to defendant physicians and expert witness physicians who opine on
compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care, those
witnesses are likely subject to a wide range of cross-examination to implicate
credibility, knowledge, and skill. Therefore, professional educational and
experiential failings may return to haunt these witnesses.
Medical negligence litigation is emotionally charged. "Some patients will
want to sue when they are disappointed, injured, or grief stricken.",302 The "war
model ' 30 3 of medical negligence litigation is an apt characterization. Plaintiffs
are particularly interested in using as much powerful evidence as is available to
defeat the defendant physician. Trial judges presiding over medical negligence
cases must be careful to understand that physicians commonly treat patients who
suffer complications of treatment or simply suffer poor outcomes. Additionally,
physicians occasionally suffer professional problems which may not directly
relate to patient care, skill, and expertise. It is simply quite easy for a trial judge
to adopt an overly inclusionary view of the rules of evidence, which should
operate to exclude evidence that is highly prejudicial and distracting to the jury.
The issue, after all, is whether the defendant physician committed malpractice
upon a particular patient at a particular time.

300. See Nowatske v. Osterloh, 549 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Wis. Ct. App, 1996) (stating that
evidence of prior malpractice was not relevant to witness's character).

301. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1).
302. Sheila M. Johnson, The Case for Medical MalpracticeMediation, 5 J. MED. & L. 21, 22

(2000).
303. Id. at 24.

